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LEAVING WONDERLAND:
DISTINGUISHING TERRORISM FROM OTHER TYPES OF CRIME*
Jonathan Leikent
"Let the jury consider their verdict, "the King said, for about the twentieth time
that day.
"No, no!" said the Queen. "Sentence first - verdict afterwards."
"Stuff and nonsense!" said Alice loudly. "The idea of having the sentence first!"
Lewis Carroll, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland
I have never felt more like Alice, as she witnessed the backwards trial
of the Knave of Hearts for stealing the Queen's tarts, than I did during the
opening moments of jury selection of my very first trial as a federal
prosecutor. It was July of 2002, less than a year after the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001. There I stood, waiting to participate in our American
criminal trial process for the very first time -- a process which I had studied
and admired for years -- when I was confronted with a problem that, for a
moment, undermined my faith and confidence in the entire system.
One of the fundamental principles of our American criminal justice
system is that citizens will participate in the process as trial jurors, and that
they will do so willingly and with a commitment to being impartial arbiters
of the facts based upon the evidence presented to them. What I witnessed
during jury selection of my first trial was a significant number of citizens in
the jury pool who showed no such commitment. Indeed, some of these
potential jurors showed a Queen of Hearts-like willingness to skip the
deliberations altogether and to convict the defendant of wrongdoing with
which he was not even charged, terrorism, based upon the only two things
that the jury pool then knew about him: his name and what he looked like.
The defendant's name was Usama Sadik Ahmed Abdel Whab. He
looked like what he was: an Arabic male in his mid-twenties.
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The judge specifically advised the jury pool -- 35 plus citizens filling
all of the rows of her courtroom -- that the defendant was charged with two
crimes and two crimes only: passport fraud and providing a false statement
to a federal agent. The judge emphasized repeatedly that there were no
other charges in the case. After so advising the jury pool, Judge McMahon
asked (as the judge always does at this point in the trial) the standard,
general preliminary question: whether any of the potential jurors felt that
they could not be fair and impartial if they were selected to sit on the jury.
An astounding number of hands shot up.
This was my first trial, and so I had no other trials with which to
compare this immediate opting-out by so many members of the jury pool.
Nevertheless, I found it astounding that such a large number would raise
their hand in response to this question. How could these people already
know, based on the limited information given to them, that they could not be
fair and impartial in this trial? Now that I have tried a number of other
criminal cases, I know that my intuitions were correct: very few, if any,
potential jurors typically raise their hands when asked this preliminary,
general question regarding their ability to be impartial in the trial.
One by one, the judge questioned these people as to their asserted
incompetency to serve as impartial jurors. One by one, these citizens made
statements revealing that they believed that the case had something to do
with terrorism and the "war on terror."
I recall one woman saying "I just couldn't..." as she eyed the defendant
accusingly. A number of other potential jurors talked about how they had
lost loved ones on 9/11. Others expressed fear of Whab. Others criticized
the Government for what they believed to be racial profiling after 9/11.
One by one, Judge McMahon dismissed each of these citizens from the jury
pool.
Hanging in the courtroom that day was a palpable sense of distrust in
the system: these citizens seemed to believe that their Government was not
telling them the whole story about this man and this trial. No matter what
the judge said to them, no matter how carefully she instructed them, they
refused to accept that a criminal prosecution of a young Arabic male in July
of 2002 was unconnected to terrorism. My gut reaction as a new prosecutor
embarking upon his first trial was to feel incredibly deflated at their lack of
faith in the system, in their Government, and in me as the Government's
representative. I wondered how our justice system, built upon the notion
that citizens will rise to the call to serve as arbiters of the facts, could
function in an environment of such distrust.
I was gratified to learn that the views expressed by this group of
potential jurors did not infect the entire panel. There were ultimately more
than enough fair-minded citizens in the venire who embraced their duty as
jurors.
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Nevertheless, it took us an entire eight-hour trial day to select a jury for
a very straightforward, short trial. Indeed, the presentation of evidence in
the case took no longer than jury selection: one day. The jurors that were
selected fulfilled their duties admirably: they listened carefully to all of the
evidence and deliberated to a unanimous verdict. Ultimately, Whab was
convicted on all counts of the Indictment.'
As lead trial counsel and the United States Government's chief
representative on the Whab case, I can say quite candidly that there were no
terrorism-related, hidden strategic reasons for charging Whab with the two
crimes of passport fraud and lying to a federal agent. This was a simple
prosecution, not unlike the hundreds of relatively simple cases that I
handled during my first year as a federal prosecutor. Whab was charged
with the crimes in the indictment for the sole reason that Whab, in fact,
committed those crimes. But it stuck in my mind -- the way that so many
potential jurors refused to participate in the case.
My original reaction to the many citizens who opted out of the Whab
trial was to condemn them for what I perceived as their failures as citizens:
for failing to fulfill their civic duty to participate as fair and impartial jurors
in determining the facts in a criminal case. Over time, however, I have
come to understand the problem and the solution somewhat differently, and
it has everything to do with terrorism.
Here in America, our understanding of terrorism has been slow to
develop -- much slower than in Israel, where domestic terrorism in
particular has been rampant for decades. It was not until after September
11, 2001 that we as a nation began to see terrorism for what it is: a different
animal than other kinds of crime. Most criminal behavior involves an
individual or group of individuals working to cheat the system. Terrorism -
- politically inspired violence directed against innocent civilians -- is a
brand of deadly, psychological warfare that has as its goal to undermine and
eventually overthrow our entire system, our political, economic and social
institutions, and our entire way of life.
Because we were slow in understanding precisely what terrorism is and
how it differs from other types of crime, there has been doubt and suspicion
about the readiness of our existing legal procedures in America to deal with
the terrorist threat. In particular, there has been doubt and suspicion about
our criminal justice system and its ability to deal with terrorism: that is, its
ability to provide due process of law to those individuals accused of being
terrorists while protecting the nation against future acts of terrorism.
1 Whab's conviction was upheld on appeal by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit. United States v. Usama Whab, 355 F.3d 155 (2d Cir. 2004). The
Supreme Court denied certiorari on April 19, 2004. Whab v. United States, 72
U.S.L.W. 3658 (U.S. Apr. 19, 2004).
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Consider the evolution of how and where our nation has charged and
tried suspected terrorists. In the 1990s, terrorism cases were handled in our
courts as a brand of serious criminal behavior, as seen in highly publicized
and successful criminal prosecutions in the Southern District of New York:
the 1993 World Trade Center bombing trial and the embassy bombings
trial. After September 11, the public was told that the alleged 2 0th hijacker,
Zacarias Moussaoui, would be tried in federal district court in Virginia, but
the prosecution stalled due to the Government's concerns about revealing to
the defendant information that it deemed vital to national security. Now,
the public is told that "enemy combatants" are being held and tried by the
military in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.
It is not hard to see why the public would be confused about how and
where our Government will charge and try terrorists. The public is left to
wonder whether the criminal trial process -- the one that they were taught
about in school; the one that they know from their personal experiences and
from television, newspapers, movies and books -- is equipped to deal with
the national security threat presented by terrorism. The public is left to
wonder whether the Government feels compelled by the perceived
limitations of the system to cut comers in bringing nominal criminal
prosecutions that are, in truth, secret counterterrorism measures against
suspected terrorists. The public is left to wonder whether they, when called
to serve as jurors in a criminal trial, are secretly being asked to decide a
question of national security: a question dealing not with past events but
with acts that have not yet occurred. The public is left to wonder, as so
many potential jurors wondered in Whab, whether they are being told the
whole story.
Forgive my pun, but we must leave Wonderland. Our criminal justice
system cannot work unless the public has complete confidence in its
integrity. We must cleanse the system, therefore, of cases that present
issues that are beyond the scope of the criminal trial process -- cases that
deal with the threat to national security posed by terrorism. The public
must understand and trust that the criminal trial process will deal with
specific enumerated crimes, and nothing more; that they will not be asked,
as jurors, to decide an issue of national security.
We must create a system where questions of national security and
accusations of terrorist activity are handled separately but within the
framework of the Constitution. The system should provide due process to
those accused of terrorist acts: where judges participate and review the
decisions of the executive branch and the military. We must dedicate
ourselves to defining the contours of this system.
Case Western Reserve University Law School has created a
Counterterrorism Lab in which law students are grappling with these
precise questions. It is my privilege to co-teach this lab with Visiting
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Professor Amos Guiora, a former military judge in Israel who has
personally presided over numerous terrorism trials. Each of the law
students in the lab is assigned a particular potential forum for charging and
trying suspected terrorists, among them: our federal courts; a court within
the jurisdiction of the United Nations; the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
court; military tribunals; and an international criminal court. Each week,
the students write an analytical paper, which they must defend in class,
considering a particular angle of a terrorism prosecution in their assigned
forum, such as: what rights must be guaranteed to the accused; what legal
representation must be provided; and what, if any, role should be played by
the media. The students in the lab have demonstrated truly innovative
thinking in analyzing these difficult issues.
We must employ this same type of thinking at the highest levels of our
Government to ensure that we design a system that operates under the rule
of law; a system which properly balances the rights of the accused and the
safety of the community in a forum separated from the criminal justice
system. If terrorists are engaged in a war of ideas to undermine our society,
we must combat this psychological warfare with ideas of our own, rooted
firmly in the principles of our Constitution. We must educate the public
about how, precisely, charges of terrorism will be handled within this
framework, to combat the confusion that exists today.
If we fail in this effort; if we allow the public confusion that I
witnessed during my first trial to persist and fester; our country and our
justice system will only fall deeper down the rabbit hole.
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